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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery, 
a felony of the first degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on November 
27, 19 73, before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, 
Judge. Appellant was found guilty of robbery, a 
felony of the second degree, and sentenced to serve 
the indeterminant term of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison. This sentence was to 
run concurrently with another of five years to life 
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which appellant was already serving. 
Appellant then timely filed a motion for a 
new trial. However, said motion was never noticed 
up for hearing before the court. Two years later, 
in 19 75, appellant filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. A hearing was held on August 21, 
19 75, before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. At 
that hearing, after the judge determined that 
appellant had never had a hearing on his prior 
motion for new trial, the judge made two obser-
vations: 1) the motion for a new trial was still 
open and so the time for appeal had not run; and 
2) the petition for the writ of habeas corpus was, 
therefore, premature. Because of the prematurity 
of the writ the judge conducted an immediate 
hearing on the motion for a new trial. He denied 
that motion on its merits. He did not deny the 
petition for the writ of habeas corpus on its 
merits but, rather, dismissed it as being premature 
(T-65, 66, Aug.21, 1975), Appellant now appeals 
from the denial of the motion for new trial and 
from the dismissal of the petition for the writ 
of habeas corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the 
lower court's action. 
- 2 -
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the first day of September, 1973, Mr, 
Terry Adams was working alone at a service station 
in Salt Lake City (T. 10). In the evening appellant 
came to the service station with a box of toilet 
articles which he wished to trade for a tank of 
gas (T. 13). Mr. Adams knew appellant from the 
Utah State Prison (T. 12), and he made the trade 
(T. 13). The two men talked for a while and then 
at closing time Mr. Adams opened a safe to deposit 
the days earnings. Appellant got behind Mr. Adams 
and told him not to lock the safe. Mr. Adams 
looked around and saw that appellant was pointing 
a pistol at him (T. 16). Mr. Adams tried to 
dissuade appellant from committing robbery but 
appellant said that he had to have the money 
(T. 16). Mr. Adams testified that he began to be 
afraid and that he didn't know if appellant would 
shoot him or not. Mr. Adams gave appellant the 
money (T. 16). Appellant then forced Mr. Adams 
into a restroom where he handcuffed him to the 
plumbing of a sink (T. 17). Appellant left and 
Mr. Adams began calling for help. A passerby came 
and called the police. The police came and unlocked 
the handcuffs (T. 18-19). 
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Appellant was charged with aggravated 
robbery, a felony of the first degree. However, 
at trial, defense counsel convinced the court to 
change the charge to simple robbery, a felony of 
the second degree (T. 34). 
Appellant was found guilty by the jury* 
Defense counsel prepared a motion for new trial 
which he filed. Defense counsel then prepared 
the supporting affidavit. Appellant, however, 
refused to sign the affidavit and decided to get 
other counsel to represent him (T. 8, Aug. 21, 1975). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONVICTION IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Respondent agrees with appellant that it is 
well established as a matter of law that a convic-
tion must be affirmed if the evidence is sufficient 
to support a finding that the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent respectfully 
submits that appellant's conviction is adequately 
supported by the evidence, every element of the 
crime of robbery being conclusively established. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Before reexamining the evidence, it is 
important to point out that a jury verdict must 
stand unless it appears that the evidence is so 
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable 
minds must have entered reasonable doubts that 
the crime was committed. State v. Sullivan, 6 
Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957); State v. Danks, 
19 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960). In other 
words there is a strong presumption in favor of 
a jury verdict. This is as it should be. The 
jury is in the best position to judge the credi-
bility of witnesses. The jury can observe facial 
expressions, mannerisms and tone of voice and thus 
are in the best position to determine who is tel-
ling the truth. For this and other reasons, evi-
dence must be viewed in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict when it is reviewed on appeal. 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959). 
See also State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 
P.2d 183 (1960), wherein the Court said: 
"We reverse a jury verdict only 
where we conclude from a consideration 
of all the evidence, and the inferences 
therefrom, viewed in the light most 
favorable to such verdict, that the 
findings are unreasonable." 11 Utah 
2d at 214. 
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In order to obtain a conviction, the state 
had to prove that appellant unlawfully and 
intentionally took property fom the immediate 
presence of another, against his will, and that 
such taking was accomplished by means of force 
or fear. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1975). 
The state called Mr. Terry Adams who testified 
that appellant pulled a gun on him and demanded 
money (T. 16). Mr. Adams said that he was 
frightened and that he didn't know whether 
appellant would shoot him or not, so he opened 
the safe and gave appellant the money (T. 16). 
Obviously this testimony establishes a prima facie 
case of robbery. 
The only real issue is the credibility of 
two witnesses: Mr. Adams, who testified of the 
robbery, supra, Richard Albiston, who testified 
for the defense. Appellant's entire defense 
centered around Richard Albiston. Albiston testi-
fied that Mr. Adams had previously approached him 
with a proposition to come and rob the service 
station and that the two of them would split the 
money (T. 36). Appellant attempted to create the 
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inference that if Mr. Adams had offered Albiston 
the chance to rob him, he probably robbed the 
station himself and locked himself in the rest-
room. The question for the jury was whether to 
believe the direct testimony of Mr. Adams, or an 
inference based on Albiston1s allegations. 
The jury believed Mr. Adams, and for 
good cause. During rebuttal the state produced 
prison records to prove conclusively that Albiston 
was at the Utah State Prison at the time that he 
alleges he met Mr. Adams and was offered the 
chance to rob the station (T.. 53,54). Albiston's 
credibility was completely destroyed. 
Appellant, however, further argues that 
since Mr. Adams is a thrice convicted felon, his 
testimony, without corroboration, is legally 
inadmissible to support a guilty verdict under 
the "reasonable doubt" standard. Appellant however 
offers no authority for this position, and respon-
dent has been unable to locate any such rule of law. 
Respondent submits that since the jury verdict is 
adequately supported by evidence, there is no cause 
for a new trial, nor is there grounds for a writ 
of habeas corpus, especially in view of the well-
established rule of law that sufficiency of evidence 
is not justiciable in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970); 
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and Application of Lewis, 339 P.2d 799, 800 
(Okla. Crim. 1959). 
Therefore, the decision of the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS EFFECTIVELY ASSISTED BY 
COUNSEL. 
In this jurisdiction, the standard for 
competent counsel is enunciated in Jaramillo v. 
Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 (1970) wherein 
the court said: 
11
 [an allegation of incompetent 
counsel only arises when] . . .there 
has been such a flagrant abuse of 
legal procedure as to amount to bad 
faith on the part of the lawyer." 
24 Utah 2d at 22. 
In Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 
(19 69), the court held that a defendant must show 
that his defense amounted to a "sham or pretense" 
before a case of ineffective assistance of counsel 
can be considered. 
Applying the rationale of the above quoted 
cases to the facts of the instant case, it is clear 
that appellant was not denied the effective assist-
ance of counsel. 
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mess testimony regarding certain weapons seized at 
an apartment in Salt Lake. One of the state witnesses 
was a Sheriff's deputy from Salt Lake County, John 
Bernardo. Officer Bernardo testified that he went 
to 555 South Third East, in Salt Lake City, in 
search of appellant. He went to that address 
because appellant's parole officer told Officer 
Bernardo that that was appellant's address. Officer 
Bernardo then testified that he recovered some 
weapons at that address (T. 26, 27). Defense 
counsel did not object to this testimony. Appel-
lant alleges that he should have, for the reason 
that that is not his address and the testimony 
is prejudicial. 
Respondent contends that there could have 
been a number of reasons why counsel would prefer 
not to object to this testimony. In the first 
place, counsel was not even aware of the fact, if 
it was a fact, that appellant was not residing at 
that address. Appellant turned to his counsel and 
revealed this fact for the first time during closing 
argument (T.5, Aug. 21, 1975). Another reason for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not objecting would be to play down the fact that 
weapons were found. No testimony ever tied the 
appellant to the weapons, whereas, an objection 
might have strengthened inferences that the weapons 
belonged to appellant. 
In any case, the very most that is shown is 
a possible error of judgment on the part of 
defense counsel. Several courts in neighboring 
jurisdictions have held that: 
"Mistakes or error of judgment 
on the part of counsel and his client 
do not establish the violation of 
constitutional rights.1' Thomas v. 
Rhay, 2 Wash. App. 843, 472 P.2d 
6060 (1970). 
See also: Landers v. State, ex rel. Eyman, 7 Ariz. 
App. 197, 437 P.2d 681 (1968); and People v. 
Hartridge, 134 C.A.2d 659, 286 P.2d 72 (1955). 
Neither is, an error of judgment the "sham or pre-
tense" or "bad faith" necessary under Utah rule, 
supra. 
Appellant also claims incompetence by alleg-
ing that his counsel failed to properly prepare for 
trial in that he failed to interview petitioner 
before trial. This allegation is absolutely false. 
Appellant himself admits that his counsel discussed the case 
- 10 -
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with him prior to the preliminary hearing, that 
counsel represented him at the preliminary hearing, 
and that counsel telephoned him between the prelimin-
ary hearing and trial (T. 20,21, Aug* 21, 1975). 
Furthermore, such a claim is incredible 
considering the fact that counsel cross-examined all 
witnesses, examined a defense witness and had 
the charge reduced from aggravated assault to simple 
assault (T. 34)• There is certainly no evidence 
of bad faith here. 
Finally appellant claims ineffective 
assistance of counsel by alleging that counsel 
failed to present a timely appeal. At the hearing 
on August 21, 19 75, this question was brought before 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. Counsel testified 
that after appellant's conviction he made a motion 
for new trial which he filed. He then drew up the 
supporting affidavit and took it to the prison for 
appellant to sign. Appellant refused to sign and 
indicated that he would get other representation 
(T. 8, Aug. 21, 1975). Obviously counsel did all 
that he could do. Appellant should not be allowed 
to proceed to contend that he was inadequately 
represented when his own actions were the cause 
of his problem. Appellant was fully informed as to 
- 11 -
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the consequences of inaction (T. 8, Aug. 21, 1975). 
The lower court ruling should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the motion for a 
new trial was properly denied by the lower court. 
Appellant failed to show sufficient grounds for a 
new trial. Appellant was lawfully convicted by 
a jury of the crime of robbery notwithstanding the 
able and effective assistance he received from 
defense counsel. His motion for a new trial being 
properly denied, respondent submits that this Court 
should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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